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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Josh Finkelman had the once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to buy tickets to Super Bowl XLVIII held in his 
home state of New Jersey in February 2014. However, the 
National Football League (“NFL”) withheld almost all of these 
tickets—99%—from the general public for league insiders, 
offering the remaining 1% to lucky winners of a lottery that all 
could enter. To get his tickets, Finkelman turned to the 
secondary market, purchasing two tickets with a face value of 
$800 each for $2000 each. One month before the Super Bowl, 
he filed suit, alleging that the NFL’s ticket distribution violated 
New Jersey law. Specifically, Finkelman claims that the NFL’s 
withholding of more than 5% of the available tickets for the 
Super Bowl violated the New Jersey Ticket Law. He has now 
had two opportunities before our Court to show that he has 
Article III standing to pursue this claim. In our first decision 
on this subject, we found that he did not. He has since added 
claims about how the NFL’s secondary ticket market 
functioned and how the NFL’s actions raised ticket prices on 
the secondary market. The District Court found that these 
additional allegations remained insufficient to allege 
Finkelman’s standing. We disagree. Based on the plausible 
economic facts pleaded in Finkelman’s amended complaint, 
we conclude that Finkelman has standing and we therefore 
have subject matter jurisdiction over this case. We defer action 
on the merits of this appeal pending decision by the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey on the pending petition for certification 
of questions of state law. 
 




On February 2, 2014, Super Bowl XLVIII was held in 
New Jersey, at MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford. Finkelman 
alleges that the NFL has a policy of withholding almost all 
Super Bowl tickets—99%—from the general public. Of these 
99%, he alleges that 75% of the withheld tickets are split 
among NFL teams, with 5% going to the host team, 17.5% 
going to each team playing in the Super Bowl, and 35% going 
to the remaining NFL teams. The remaining 25% of tickets are 
withheld for companies, broadcast networks, media sponsors, 
the host committee, and other “league insiders.” The 1% of 
tickets for public purchase are sold through a lottery system. In 
order to acquire a ticket in the lottery, a person has to enter by 
the deadline, be selected as a winner, and choose to actually 
purchase a ticket. 
 
Finkelman alleges that he purchased two tickets on the 
secondary market. Although these tickets had a face value of 
$800 each, he purchased them for $2,000 per ticket. He did not 
enter the lottery to seek to win the 1% of tickets offered at face 
value to lucky members of the public. 
 
In January 2014, Plaintiff Finkelman filed a putative 
class action in the District of New Jersey against the NFL and 
various affiliated entities, alleging that the Defendants violated 
New Jersey’s Ticket Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-35.1, by 
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withholding more than 5% of tickets to the Super Bowl.1 This 
law, part of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”),2 
reads:  
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, who 
has access to tickets to an event prior to the 
tickets’ release for sale to the general public, to 
withhold those tickets from sale to the general 
public in an amount exceeding 5% of all 
available seating for the event. 
II. Procedural History 
 
A. First District Court Decision 
 
In the first round of this case, Defendants moved to 
dismiss Finkelman’s first amended complaint under Rule 
                                                 
1 Originally, this suit also included a second plaintiff, Ben 
Hoch-Parker, who alleged that he wanted to buy Super Bowl 
tickets but did not because of the high prices on the secondary 
market. The District Court found that he had no Article III 
standing to sue, and we affirmed that dismissal. See Finkelman 
v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Thus, he is no longer in the case. Plaintiff originally also 
brought an unjust enrichment claim, but the operative 
complaint no longer includes this claim. 
2 The CFA permits private plaintiffs to sue any person who 
violates the Act and causes them ascertainable damages. N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19. 
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12(b)(6) and the District Court granted the motion.3 Without 
addressing Article III standing, the District Court reasoned that 
Defendants never “withheld” tickets within the meaning of the 
Ticket Law because they did not keep tickets in their custody. 
Instead, they “allocated” 100% of all available tickets by 
giving 99% of them to NFL teams and other League insiders 
and holding a lottery to sell the remaining 1% of tickets. The 
District Court also concluded that Finkelman failed to plead 
causation under the CFA because he never entered the ticket 
lottery. 
 
B. First Decision of Our Court 
 
 On appeal, we concluded that Finkelman did not 
establish Article III standing.4 In doing so, we considered two 
theories Finkelman pleaded to prove standing. First, we 
considered whether Finkelman had standing because the 
NFL’s ticket withholding prevented him from buying a ticket 
at face value. We found that he had not shown a causal 
connection between the NFL’s actions and the injury framed 
in this way, because Finkelman failed to enter the lottery to buy 
face value tickets. So, any harm that Finkelman suffered was 
properly attributed not to the NFL, but rather to his own 
decision not to enter the ticket lottery. Thus, Finkelman failed 
to allege standing on this theory.5  
                                                 
3 Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-
00096, Dkt. 54; App. Vol III 281. See also App. Vol. III 233-
80 (transcript of oral argument and opinion). 
4 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 197. We omit a discussion of Hoch-
Parker’s standing since he is no longer in the case. 
5 Id. at 197-99. 
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Second, we considered whether Finkelman had standing 
because the NFL’s ticket withholding policy increased the cost 
of the tickets that he purchased on the secondary market. Under 
this theory, his damages would not be the difference between 
the ticket’s face value and the price that he paid, but instead the 
difference between what he paid on the secondary market and 
what the tickets would have cost on the secondary market had 
the NFL not withheld tickets in alleged violation of the Ticket 
Law.  
 
However, we found that Finkelman had not pleaded 
specific enough allegations to demonstrate that the NFL’s 
withholding actually did increase the price he paid for tickets 
on the secondary market. We noted the basic economic theory 
that limiting supply increases price. Thus, one could assume 
that the NFL’s restriction on the availability of Super Bowl 
tickets to the public increased the price that Finkelman paid for 
his tickets. Unfortunately for Finkelman, this mere assumption 
was not enough to prove his standing. Under the scheme 
Finkelman pleaded, it was also possible that NFL insiders that 
had obtained non-public tickets were willing to resell to the 
public, so that supply was not artificially limited and the price 
inflated in the secondary market. Moreover, we posited that if 
some of those NFL insiders did not have to pay for their tickets 
originally, they might be willing to resell their tickets on the 
secondary market for less than a member of the public who 
paid face value would have done. So, the NFL’s withholding 




We explained that to establish Article III standard based 
on this theory, under the familiar Twombly-Iqbal standard,6 
Finkelman needed to plead facts specific enough to allege that 
the NFL’s ticket withholding caused the price he paid for 
tickets on the secondary market to rise. Because we could only 
speculate as to the effects the NFL withholding had on 
secondary ticket prices, the allegations were insufficient to 
establish Article III standing. We remanded to allow the 
District Court to exercise its discretion as to whether 
Finkelman should be granted leave to amend.7 
 
 C. Second Amended Complaint 
 
The District Court granted Finkelman’s motion to 
amend the complaint,8 and Finkelman filed a Second Amended 
Complaint.9 In it, Finkelman pursued only the second theory 
of standing, mapped out in our first opinion. To do so, 
Finkelman added facts alleged by Daniel Rascher, an 
economist who specializes in sports and ticketing on the 
workings of secondary ticket markets in events like the Super 
Bowl.10 Rascher concludes that the NFL’s withholding 
resulted in fewer tickets being available on the secondary 
market and higher prices for those tickets that were available. 
                                                 
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
7 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 199-203. 
8 Finkelman, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00096, Dkt. 82; App. Vol. III 
294. 
9 Finkelman, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00096, Dkt. 83; App. Vol. III 
295-336. 
10 These factual allegations can be found at SAC ¶¶ 40-43, 
App. Vol. III at 308-17.  
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In support of this conclusion, he explains that under the NFL’s 
current system, NFL insiders sell their tickets to a concentrated 
group of brokers, who in turn charge more for tickets on the 
secondary market. Without the NFL withholding, he posits that 
there would be more fan-to-fan direct sales of tickets, cutting 
out more brokers and allowing for lower prices. He explains 
that NFL insiders are more likely to use brokers to resell their 
tickets than fans would be, either because the insiders are not 
technically allowed to sell their tickets or because they seek to 
avoid unwanted publicity from the sales. Rascher also states 
that the NFL’s initial withholding adds an additional layer in 
the supply chain (insider-to-broker sales), which results in 
higher prices for customers. He cites research by himself and 
other economists in support of these allegations. 
 
D. Second District Court Opinion  
 
Defendants again moved to dismiss,11 and the District 
Court granted the motion.12 The District Court found that 
Finkelman had not proved standing because he did not enter 
the NFL’s ticket lottery and because the additional facts 
Finkelman alleged regarding causation were too conclusory. 
Furthermore, in the alternative, the District Court reasoned that 
even if Finkelman did have standing, Finkelman had not 
properly alleged a violation of the Ticket Law, reiterating its 
interpretation of the Ticket Law from its first decision.  
                                                 
11 Finkelman, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00096, Dkt. 92; App. Vol. III 
337-38. 




III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
  
This is a diversity suit over which the District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.13 This 
Court has jurisdiction over the final judgment of the District 
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
The Court’s review of a decision dismissing a 





Finkelman appeals the District Court’s judgment which 
followed our remand, arguing that he has properly pleaded 
Article III standing and has properly pleaded a claim under the 
Ticket Law to overcome Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss. 
 
                                                 
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (“The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in 
which . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 
State different from any defendant”). 
14 Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 
2015); United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 519 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2012).   
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Because “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot 
proceed at all in any cause,”15 we first consider whether 
Finkelman has alleged facts sufficient to establish Article III 
standing at this stage in the litigation. To establish Article III 
standing, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a 
sufficient causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.”16 
  
First, to state an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must allege 
“the invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected 
interest resulting in harm that is actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”17 In turn, “[a] harm is 
particularized if it affects the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way. It is concrete if it is de facto; that is, it must 
actually exist rather than being only abstract.”18 “While it is 
difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic 
injury is one of its paradigmatic forms.”19 
 
To show causation, the alleged injury must be “fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the 
result of the independent action of some third party not before 
                                                 
15 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 
(1998).  
16 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 
272 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).  
17 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
18 Id. (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). 
19 Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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the court.”20 Causation in this context is akin to ‘but-for’ 
causation in tort and “may be satisfied even where the conduct 
in question might not have been a proximate cause of the 
harm.”21 To satisfy it, “an indirect causal relationship will 
suffice, provided that there is a fairly traceable connection 
between the alleged injury-in-fact and the alleged conduct of 
the defendant.”22 
 
To show redressability, a plaintiff must show that it is 
“likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the alleged 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”23 
 
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing.24 
“[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any 
other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of the litigation.”25 Thus, at this stage of the 
                                                 
20 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 193 (internal citation omitted).  
21 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
22 Id. at 193-94 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
23 Id. at 194 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
24 Danvers, 432 F.3d at 291. 
25 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  
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litigation, we use the same standard we apply when assessing 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.26 
 
To do so, “[f]irst, we take note of the elements a plaintiff 
must plead to state a claim—here, the three elements of Article 
III standing. Second, we eliminate from consideration any 
allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are 
not entitled to the assumption of truth. Third, where there are 
well-pleaded factual allegations, we assume their veracity and 
then determine whether they plausibly establish the 
prerequisites of standing.”27 If Finkelman cannot establish 
standing, we must dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.28 
 
                                                 
26 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 194 (internal citation omitted). 
Plaintiff argues that his pleadings do not have to meet the 
standard of Twombly and Iqbal in order to allege standing at 
this phase. We need not reach this question—we continue to 
apply the same standard that we did in the first opinion in this 
case. See Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 194 n.5 (“Some of our sister 
circuits have questioned how well the ‘plausibility’ standard of 
Iqbal and Twombly maps onto standing doctrine . . . . Without 
wading too deeply into this particular thicket, we are content 
to say that, even when reviewing only the bare allegations of a 
complaint, Iqbal and Twombly teach that standing cannot rest 
on mere “legal conclusions” or “naked assertions.”). 
27 Id. (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).  
28 Id. at 195 (citing Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 
F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘cases or controversies’ 




In finding that Finkelman had not properly alleged 
standing in our initial opinion, we compared this case to 
Dominguez v. UAL Corp., in which the D.C. Circuit reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant and found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.29 
We noted that in that case, “[t]he plaintiff . . . sued United Air 
Lines under the federal antitrust laws, asserting that United’s 
prohibition on reselling airplane tickets deprived him of a 
secondary market in which he might have been able to 
purchase tickets for less money than he paid United.”30 To 
allege that United’s prohibition had caused him an injury-in-
fact, the plaintiff had offered testimony from an expert who had 
surveyed United customers and concluded that “a high 
percentage of respondents would consider using a feature that 
allowed them to legally sell or give away airline tickets they 
are unable to use.”31 The D.C. Circuit found this insufficient to 
show standing because the plaintiff’s expert “did not take into 
account costs associated with running a secondary market” 
such as the costs of changing United’s reservation system, the 
possible introduction of new, seller-imposed fees, and other 
factors that might influence prices in a hypothetical resale 
market.32 Thus, like Finkelman in his earlier complaint, the 
plaintiff could only speculate as to whether an end to United’s 
prohibition would have led to lower ticket prices. 
 
Here, however, in his amended complaint, Finkelman 
has offered specific factual allegations above and beyond those 
described in Dominguez. Finkelman did not just allege that 
                                                 
29 666 F.3d 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
30 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 201. 
31 Dominguez, 666 F.3d at 1363. 
32 Id. at 1363-64. 
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prices would be lower on the secondary market were it not for 
the NFL’s withholding. Instead, Finkelman alleged a causal 
chain justifying why the NFL’s withholding set into motion a 
series of events that ultimately raised prices on the secondary 
market. Specifically, Finkelman alleged that the insiders to 
whom the NFL presently provides tickets are more likely to re-
sell those tickets through third-party brokers to keep those sales 
anonymous, and those brokers in turn are more likely to charge 
higher prices. But if more tickets were made available to fans 
initially, fans would be more likely than the NFL insiders are 
to sell through direct fan-to-fan sales, and the prices would 
likely be lower.33 
 
 Given Finkelman’s additional factual allegations, a 
different D.C. Circuit case, Osborn v. Visa Inc.,34 is more 
instructive. In that case, users and operators of non-bank 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) sued Visa, MasterCard, 
and affiliated banks alleging anticompetitive behavior in 
pricing ATM access fees. In their complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged that in the absence of the defendants’ anticompetitive 
behavior, ATM operators would charge MasterCard and Visa 
customers higher rates than non-MasterCard and Visa 
customers. This, in turn, would drive customers to pressure 
their banks to offer cards using networks other than 
MasterCard or Visa, which would make this market more 
competitive and result in more choice of networks, lower fees 
for consumers, and greater profits for non-bank ATM 
operators.35 In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the 
                                                 
33 SAC ¶ 40, App. Vol. III 312-14. 
34 797 F.3d 1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
35 Id. at 1063. 
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D.C. District Court found that the plaintiff’s allegations 
constituted an “attenuated, speculative chain of events[ ] that 
relies on numerous independent actors” and dismissed the 
complaint.36 
  
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed. It held that “the 
District Court was demanding proof of an economic theory that 
was not required in a complaint.”37 The Court noted: 
At the pleadings stage, a court must accept as true all 
material allegations of the complaint, an obligation that 
we have recognized might appear to be in tension with 
the Court’s further admonition that an allegation of injury 
or of redressability that is too speculative will not suffice 
to invoke the federal judicial power. But this ostensible 
tension is reconciled by distinguishing allegations of 
facts, either historical or otherwise demonstrable, from 
allegations that are really predictions. Thus, when 
considering any chain of allegations for standing 
purposes, we may reject as overly speculative . . . those 
types of allegations that are not normally susceptible of 
labelling as “true” or “false.”38  
                                                 
36 Id. (quoting Nat’l ATM Council, Inc. v. Visa Inc., 7 F. Supp. 
3d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 2013)). See also id. at 1064 (“The District 
Court reasoned that the protracted chain of causation alleged 
by Plaintiffs fails both because of the uncertainty of several 
individual links and because of the number of speculative links 
that must hold for the chain to connect the challenged acts to 
the asserted particularized injury.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)). 
37 Id. at 1063. 
38 Id. at 1064 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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The D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ theory was 
“susceptible to proof at trial.”39 It noted that the complaint 
contained “factual details” supporting the “alleged causal link” 
between the defendants’ behavior and plaintiffs’ economic 
harm.40 The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ allegations 
did “rely on certain economic assumptions about supply and 
demand” but noted that “these sorts of assumptions are 
provable at trial.”41 Distinguishing Dominguez and other cases 
decided on summary judgment, the Court noted that the 
plaintiffs had no obligation to offer evidence of their theory 
here, as “[a] Rule 12(b)(1) motion . . . is not the occasion for 
evaluating the empirical accuracy of an economic theory.”42 
The Court concluded that “[b]ecause the economic facts 
alleged by the Plaintiffs are specific, plausible, and susceptible 
to proof at trial, they pass muster for standing purposes at the 
pleadings stage.”43 
 
In this case, too, Finkelman has offered economic facts 
that are specific, plausible, and susceptible to proof at trial. 
Defendants may be correct that Finkelman will not be able to 
prove that the 2014 Superbowl secondary ticket market worked 
as he claims. Defendants remain free to bring a factual 
challenge to jurisdiction disputing just that. But Finkelman is 
not required to prove his economic theory in his complaint, 
                                                 
39 Id. at 1065. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. See also id. (“Indeed, allegations of economic harm 
‘based on standard principles of “supply and demand”’ are 
‘routinely credited by courts in a variety of contexts.’”) 
(quoting Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 923 (1st Cir. 1993). 
42 Id. at 1065-66. 
43 Id. at 1066. 
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and, at this stage in the litigation, Finkelman has alleged 
sufficient factual allegations to show that Defendants’ 
withholding raised the price that he paid for tickets on the 
secondary market. Thus, Finkelman has Article III standing.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
 We reverse the District Court and find that we have 
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. We defer action on 
the merits of this appeal pending a decision by the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey on a petition for certification of questions 
of state law. We shall retain jurisdiction over the appeal 
pending resolution of the certification. 
